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Abstract
This paper focuses on the relation between state policies and ethnicisation in the bor-
derland of Bengal. On the basis of a case study of the lowland Garos of Bangladesh,
the paper argues that attempts by the successor states of Bengal, East Pakistan and
Bangladesh to ‘other’, and even ‘exclude’, the Garos have significantly impacted on
Garo self-perception and organisation, resulting in the formation of a close-knit
ethnic community. The paper focuses on three twentieth-century episodes in the
lives of the lowland Garos. The first is the 1936 British administrative reorganisation
of Mymensingh District which resulted in the emergence of a notion of a separate
Garo homeland in Bengal. The second is the mass exodus of Garos across the inter-
national border into the Indian hills which took place in 1964. This traumatic experi-
ence pushed the Garos to unify. The third is the Independence War of 1971 and the
birth of Bangladesh. All three episodes are directly related to state policies which
excluded the Garos (as well as the neighbouring minorities) from the dominant dis-
course of Bengali/Bangladeshi citizenship. The paper concludes that the Garos of
Bangladesh are a close-knit ethnic community—not in spite of these state atti-
tudes—but rather as an outcome of them.
Introduction
‘What do you mean, there were no tribes in Africa?’ The distinguished Africanist
Donald R. Wright often heard this retort from students taking his course on pre-
colonial African history.1 They would feel dissatisfied with his claim that ethnicity
1 Donald R. Wright, ‘“What do you mean, there were no tribes in Africa?”: Thoughts on Boundaries and Related
Matters in Precolonial Africa’, in History in Africa, Vol.XXVI (1999), pp.409–26.
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was not a deeply-rooted cultural characteristic of Africans but a colonial
construction; that Europeans had based their ideas of African tribalism on their
own preconceptions and cultural backgrounds rather than on historical evidence;
and that historical sources about pre-colonial history were far too limited to sub-
stantiate any claim that African tribes are remnants of a distant past.
I refer to the reaction of Wright’s students and to his arguments about the scarcity of
historical evidence as they show certain noteworthy similarities with my own
research experiences with the Garos of Bangladesh. In spite of the paucity of (pre-
colonial) historical sources, the suggestion that these hill people have always been
divided into clearly-distinct tribal or ethnic communities is commonly (and uncriti-
cally) deemed a historical fact. Such a conceptualisation of the past could be partially
explained by the traditions of knowledge-production on the region and its tribal or
upland populations. In South Asia, uplanders or tribes typically belong to the
realm of anthropologists, whose primary concerns are ‘“living cultures” of specified
populations and their life-ways in locally delimited habitats’, and not long-term his-
torical developments.2 Yet this lack of historical knowledge is also related to the
absence of any sense of urgency for an historical perspective.3 In South Asia, main-
stream notions of ‘tribe’ render historical scrutiny redundant, since dominant stereo-
typical ideas commonly imply that ‘tribal’ populations have no relevant histories
anyway.4
This paper focuses on one such ‘tribe’, the Garos of Bangladesh. From 1993 to 2000
I carried out research among this rather small community of so-called tribal
lowlanders. From 1994 to 1995, I worked closely together with Suborno Chisim, a
young Garo from Bangladesh, who acted as my research assistant, translator and
key informant. During that year, we carried out all field research together.5 My
project was to examine the process of identity/ethnicity formation among these
2 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1982), p.13.
3 See for example H.C. Sharma, anthropologist of Northeast India, who comments that ‘until now very little has been
done in the area of archaeological research though the prehistoric sites that have been discovered so far in this region
would justify this’. H.C. Sharma, ‘Prehistoric Archeology of the North-East’, in T.B. Subba and G.C. Ghosh (eds),
The Anthropology of North-East India (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003), p.12.
4 Willem van Schendel pointed out that South Asian tribes are often depicted as if they share a number of ‘essentially
tribal characteristics’ that are fundamentally different from, even opposite to, ‘civilised society’. Such characteristics
include innocence, childish behaviour, primitive culture and the absence of any noteworthy history. See Willem van
Schendel, ‘The Invention of the “Jummas”: State Formation and Ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh,’ in Modern
Asian Studies, Vol.XXVI, no.1 (Feb. 1992), pp.95–128.
5 I first visited Bangladesh in November 1993. During that visit I met Suborno Chisim who became my research
assistant during my one-year field research from March 1994 to March 1995. His contribution was vital to this
research project. When I use ‘we/us’ in the text I refer to him and me. I myself remain entirely accountable for
this text.
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Garos. The scarcity and nature of the existing historical data (note that any written
documentation by the Garos themselves is virtually non-existent) proved a serious
limitation to my study—but did not render it impossible. Through a careful combi-
nation of a wide variety of documentation (by administrators, researchers, mission-
aries, etc.) and oral history, I was able to study how these Garos have come to
constitute the clearly-distinct and self-conscious ethnic community they are today.
Elsewhere I distinguish several different but intricately interwoven factors that con-
tributed to this process of identity-formation or ethnicisation.6 These include the
influence of colonial discourse of tribe, administrative strategies to identify, categor-
ise, and govern the people of British India, the role of missionaries and religious con-
version, the trans-national discourse and movement of indigenous peoples, and the
emerging social, economic, political and psychological needs that encouraged the
Garos to unite.
While Wright uses the terms ‘tribe’ and ‘ethnicity’ more or less interchangeably,7
I make a clear distinction between the two. Many scholars of South Asia have con-
tinued to use tribe either as an analytical category or simply as a label for certain
communities or movements, even though the term ‘tribe’ often carries notions of
primitivity and backwardness.8 Morever, so-called tribal studies often concentrate
on ‘tribal culture’ instead of historical processes of group formation. Contemporary
conceptualisations of ethnicity on the other hand assume a dynamic and relational
perspective on group identities and inter-group relations. They concentrate on the
social interaction by which cultural differences between groups are communicated
and the context in which these interactions take place, rather than on cultural
particularities as such.9
I primarily concentrate though on the relationship between state policies and ethni-
cisation. It is my contention that the policies of the successive states of East Bengal,
East Pakistan and Bangladesh to ‘other’, ‘exclude’, and/or even evict the Garos from
the state and/or the nation, have significantly impacted on Garo self-perception,
awareness and organisation, resulting in the articulation of ethnic boundaries
between the Garos and others and the under-communication of differences
6 Ellen Bal, ‘They Ask If We Eat Frogs’: Social Boundaries, Ethnic Categorisation, and the Garo People of
Bangladesh (Delft: Eburon, 2000). A revised and updated edition is forthcoming in 2007 entitled ‘They Ask If
We Eat Frogs: Garo Ethnicity in Bangladesh (Singapore: ISEAS).
7 Wright, “What do you mean, there were no tribes in Africa?”, pp.409–26.
8 Cf. Crispin Bates, ‘“Lost Innocents and the Loss of Innocence”: Interpreting Adivasi Movements in South Asia’, in
R.H. Barnes, Andrew Gray and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), Indigenous Peoples of Asia (Ann Arbor: The Association
for Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1995), p.103; and Susana B.C. Devalle, Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture
and Protest in Jharkhand (New Delhi & Newberry Park, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1992), p.28.
9 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London and Sterling, Va.:
Pluto Press, 2nd ed., 2002), p.58.
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amongst them. I argue, in other words, that the present-day Garos of Bangladesh do
not form a closely-knit ethnic community in spite of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century state attitudes towards East Bengal’s minorities, but rather because of
them.10
Here I build my argument around three significant episodes in the lives of the
Bangladeshi Garos, in which state interventions and positions vis-a`-vis the Garos
influenced their self-awareness and organisation. The first event was the colonial cre-
ation of the Partially Excluded Area in 1936 (more commonly known as the PEA) in
the northernmost part of Mymensingh District, bordering the Garo Hills. In the
minds of the lowland Garos the PEA came to stand for a separate Garo ‘homeland’
in Bengal. The second event was the turbulent exodus of the Garos (and other min-
orities) from East Pakistan in 1964. According to several informants this experience
was the turning-point in their history—the one that prompted the Garos to unite.
Others referred to it as the dividing line between good times and bad. The third
episode I will treat is the 1971 Liberation War and the ensuing birth of Bangladesh.
Initially the foundation of Bangladesh as a new nation-state seemed to hold out the
promise of inclusion to all as equal citizens. However the Garos soon discovered
that, once again, they did not comply with the dominant notion of what constituted
ideal-type citizens.
First, however, some background on the Garos of Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh:
who are they, and why should we distinguish them from the hill Garos living in the
Indian state of Meghalaya?
The Lowland Garos of Bangladesh
While largely absent from the national history of Bangladesh as actors (rather than
as exotic objects), I could hardly maintain that the Garos are a new topic of interest.
Since John Eliot’s encounter with the ‘Garrows’ in 1788–1789 ‘as the first European
who has travelled among them’, numerous books and articles about the Garos have
been published.11 These publications, however, mainly deal with the uplanders
10 This is no novel argument as such. However for the Garos of Bangladesh, no other empirical analysis of this
process has ever been undertaken. Cf. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Abhijit Dasgupta and Willem van Schendel, who
underline the necessity to analyse the role of states in the marginalisation of communities and ensuing ethnic inno-
vation. See ‘Introduction’, in Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Abhijit Dasgupta and Willem van Schendel (eds), Bengal.
Communities, Development and States (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1995), pp.1–17.
11 John Eliot, ‘Observations on the Inhabitants of the Garrow Hills. Made during a Public Deputation in the Years
1788 and 1789’, in Asiatic Researches, Vol.III (New Delhi: Cosmo Publications [1794] 1979), pp.17–37. Sipra Sen
gives some 582 references on the Garos in her extensive, but by far not exhaustive, bibliography. Sipra Sen, The
Tribes of Meghalaya (Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1985), pp.14–62.
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living in Meghalaya, in the district named Garo Hills. The much smaller number of
lowland Garos of East Bengal have rarely been studied.12 Nonetheless for various
reasons these lowland Garos have their own history(ies). The international border
that has officially separated the lowlanders from the hill Garos since the Partition
of India and the formation of Pakistan in 1947 reflected real differences between
the uplanders and plains dwellers. Major A. Playfair, who published the first ethno-
graphy on the Garos in 1909, distinguished ‘those who inhabit the Garo Hills dis-
trict’ from ‘those who reside in the plains and are scattered over a very wide area
of country’.13 And the anthropologist Chie Nakane also believes that the division
into hill and plains Garos represented a prime division of the Garos:
The Garo of the plains have become more sophisticated by closer
contacts with the lowland peoples and many of them have adopted
Christianity. They seldom come into contact with the hill-dwellers
and live in an entirely different ecological and cultural environment
from the latter.14
Lowland Garos have long been in contact with Bengali life-styles, language and
religions (Islam and Hinduism); the natural environment (and climate) of the
plains require different agricultural methods, hence a different style of living,
eating, and dressing; and, as we shall later see, the political status of the two
regions had also diverged long before Partition. The lowland Garo kinship
system also shows some remarkable differences from that of the hill Garos.
While, for example, lowlanders primarily resort to their mahari or ma’chong
(matrilineal kin group) titles, hill Garos use either ‘Marak’ or ‘Sangma’.15
Unlike before, when property would be passed on from mothers to daughters,
Garo women have begun to divide their property amongst both daughters
and sons.
At present, the segmentation into (Indian) hill Garos and (Bangladeshi) lowland
Garos is also reflected in the names they give themselves. Bangladeshi Garos gen-
erally identify themselves as ‘Mandi’, which literally means ‘human being’, while
they refer to the Indian hill Garos as ‘A’chik’ meaning ‘hill person’. I prefer to
use the name ‘Garos’ or ‘Bangladeshi Garos’. To outsiders (both national and
international) they are simply known as Garos, a name which encompasses the
12 But see for example Robbins Burling, The Strong Women of Modhupur (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1997).
13 A. Playfair, The Garos (Gauhati and Calcutta: United Publishers [1909] 1975), p.59.
14 Chie Nakane, Garo and Khasi. A Comparative Study in Matrilineal Systems (Paris: Mouton and Co., 1967),
pp.21–2.
15 Garos are primarily divided into these two exogamous groups. A third group is Momin, but in Bangladesh they are
very few in number.
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larger imagined community that includes the hill Garos from across the border
in India.16
Unlike nearly 90 percent of the 150 million Bangladeshis who are Bengali Muslims,
the Garos (and other so-called ‘tribal’ communities) are neither Bengali by ethnicity
and culture nor Muslim by religion. According to the population census of 1991
these ‘other people of Bangladesh’,17 numbering 1.2 million, made up approxi-
mately one percent of all Bangladeshis.18 There is no recent information about the
ethnic constitution of Bangladeshis and it is unclear how many different ethnic
groups there are (though estimates range from 20 to 56).
Amongst the Garos of Bangladesh we may broadly distinguish four categories on
the basis of habitat. The large majority reside in the most northern fringe of
what used to be called Greater Mymensingh, bordering the Indian state of
Meghalaya. A second category (some 15 percent) live in the Modhupur forest. A
third segment are those who in the years after the Partition of 1947 moved to the
tea estates and pan plantations in Sylhet (north-eastern Bangladesh, bordering the
Khasi Hills in India). The fourth, ever-growing sub-section are those Garos who
migrated to the larger towns and cities such as Mymensingh, Dhaka and Chitta-
gong. In the following analysis, I concentrate on the lowland Garos of northern
Mymensingh’s borderland.
Constructing Notions of a Garo Land
Until the early nineteenth century, the various rulers of Bengal showed little interest
in northern Mymensingh and its population. The Mughal rulers had adopted a policy
of non-interference and did not intervene in the management of the string of frontier
estates on the border of the inaccessible hill areas which bounded the north-eastern
part of Bengal. And the British, who replaced the Mughals in the late eighteenth
century, continued on the same line, leaving northern Mymensingh in the hands
of local landlords (referred to as zamindars, choudries or rajas). This laissez-faire
stance ended, however, after the local peasantry took up arms against zamindari
exploitation in 1824–25 and again in 1833—the Pagol Panthi uprisings. The unrest
prompted the colonial government to react. It suppressed the rebellious peasants
and broke the powerful position of the local zamindars in the region. Nevertheless,
16 Robbins Burling chose to use ‘Mandi’ instead. Unlike me he noticed some resentment against the name Garo.
Burling, The Strong Women of Modhupur, pp.3–4.
17 Cf. Willem van Schendel and Ellen Bal, ‘Beyond the “Tribal” Mind-Set: Studying Non-Bengali Peoples in
Bangladesh and West Bengal’, in Georg Pfeffer and Deepak Kumar Behera (eds), Contemporary Societies: Tribal
Studies. Volume V: Concept of Tribal Society (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co., 2002), pp.121–39.
18 It should be noted that some 10–12 percent of the population are Hindu Bengalis (or Bengali Hindus).
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power relations in this part of Bengal remained unsettled for many years to come. Only
when the British government laid down an official boundary along the foot of the hills in
1869 and brought an end to the collection of rents and cesses in the hills, did conflict
between the zamindars and the hill Garos stop.19 Three years later, in 1872, the Garo
Hills were officially incorporated into the British Empire.20
Numerous nineteenth-century administrative reports make reference to the ‘unruly
and fierce hill Garos’, but information about nineteenth-century northern
Mymensingh is scarce. The few available documents paint a picture of a ‘backward’
region of great linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. Apart from
Bengali-speaking people, colonial reports mention Hajongs, Koches, Banais,
Dalus, Hodies, Rajbansis, and Garos.21 Yet while ethnic and communal differences
increasingly came to characterise inter-group relations in the twentieth century, these
did not seem to play any significant role earlier. The Pagol Panthi movement, for
instance, had attracted peasants from various religious, linguistic and cultural back-
grounds. It had been class-based, organised against zamindari suppression and the
colonial state on the basis of a shared experience of exploitation.22
The Five Thanas of the Partially Excluded Area
The relative ‘administrative invisibility’ of northern Mymensingh came to an end in
1936, when the British converted it into a regular district. However the five north-
ernmost thanas23 or administrative units of Mymensingh were partially excluded
from this administrative reorganisation and placed under the direct control of the
governor of Bengal. They remained under Mymensingh District, but no provincial
or state act could be applied until approved by the governor, who was thus allowed
to directly interfere in any local situation. In 1938 a new revenue settlement was
commissioned which produced the first really informative and extensive official
document on the area.24 Its author R.W. Bastin nevertheless ventured into sensitive
19 The Revenue Survey of Mymensingh (1857) demarcated the northern boundary of Mymensingh along the foot of
the Garo Hills. The Sherpur and Shushong zamindars stated that this line did not represent the northern boundary of
their estates and the Shushong zamindar took the matter to the local Revenue and Civil Courts and next to the High
Court. Although he finally lost the battle, he did receive financial compensation for his loss. The 1869 Act, which
came into effect in 1870, asserted the boundary between Mymensingh and the Garo Hills. See General Adminis-
tration Report of the Garo Hills District for the Year 1875–76 (Simla: Government Central Branch Press, 1876).
20 For the process of consolidation of British administration in the hills, see for instance Jayanta Bhusan
Bhattacharjee, The Garos and the English 1765–1874 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), pp.182–228; and
Parimal Chandra Kar, British Annexation of the Garo Hills (Calcutta: Nababharat Publishers, 1970), pp.42–77.
21 Willem van Schendel, ‘“Madmen” of Mymensingh: Peasant Resistance and the Colonial Process in Eastern India,
1824–1833’, in The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.XXII, no.2 (1985), p.151.
22 Ibid.
23 The area comprised the five northern thanas (administrative units, or police stations) of Mymensingh: Sribarddi,
Nalitabari, Haluaghat, Durgapur, and Kalmakanda.
24 R.W. Bastin, Final Report of the Settlement Operations in Five Thanas of Partially Excluded Area of Mymensingh
1938–42 (Dacca: East Bengal Government Press, 1954).
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political territory when he argued that their lack of sophistication and education
placed these ‘simple tribals’ at a disadvantage in dealing with the cleverer and
better-educated Bengalis.25
Why did the government suddenly bother about this ‘peripheral’ region after a long
period of disinterest? Close reading of Bastin’s report reveals one reason—the good
‘working relation’ that had been established between the colonial government and
local Christian missionary societies. Missionaries had been proselytising in
Bengal since the sixteenth century—with little success. Then in the second half of
the nineteenth century, ‘[a] vast new field. . .opened in Garo land’. There, the mis-
sionaries decided, ‘there was hope of making an appreciable number of converts’.26
And so it proved. The Garos converted in their thousands. Interestingly, though, the
low-caste Hindu minorities in this same part of Bengal (the Hodies, Hajongs,
Koches, Banais, etc.) showed no interest in conversion. Therefore the missionaries
were very protective of ‘their Garo field’.
The partial exclusion of the five thanas served both parties. The poverty and indebt-
edness of the Garos pricked the consciences of the missionaries, since ‘there was
the obvious fact that a chronically destitute Catholic is a poor advertisement for the
Church in this land where wealth and health are regarded generally as positive
marks of divine favour’.27 Also the government and the missionaries had a common
interest in dampening down anti-colonial agitation, and the government believed
that missionary influence had prevented the Indian nationalist movement from estab-
lishing a stronghold among the Garos and deterred them from taking part in any of the
peasant struggles stirred up by Gandhi’s Civil Disobedience Movement.28
Constructing Notions of a Garo Homeland in Bengal
The decision to partially exclude the five northern thanas of Mymensingh brought
not only a number of practical opportunities for the local population such as
25 Another reason applied especially to the Garos, who formed the majority of the so-called aboriginals. Their matri-
lineal system positioned them adversely since, according to Bastin, it did not give men any incentive to work. Ibid.,
pp.123–4.
26 Edmund N. Goedert, Holy Cross Priests in the Diocese of Dacca 1853–1981 (Notre Dame, Indiana: Province
Archive Center, 1983), p.16.
27 The Bengalese, Vol.XIV, no.9 (Oct. 1933), p.13.
28 For example in 1930, the Baptist newsletter Our Bond proudly mentioned that Swarajists were unsuccessful with
the Garos: ‘It is evident that the Garo people have no doubts as to whether they want Swaraj [Self-Rule] or not.
The other day an old man said, “While the English live we live; when they die, we die with them.” The youthful
courageous Gandhi followers have failed in all their attempts to hold hartals [general strikes], and arouse the
non-co-operative spirit among them. An amusing tale is told of how, a few weeks ago, a number of young braves
saw the mighty host of Garos in all their war paint approaching them, they fled for life and nothing more was
heard of their four days’ hartal’. Our Bond, Vol.XXXVI, no.1 (January 1930), p.8.
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education, funding-schemes, health-care, etc., it also provided the Garos with a clear
conception of a separate Garo homeland in Bengal. Interestingly, though, none of the
other local minorities managed to organise themselves collectively as well as the
Garos did. As a result the Hodies, Mandis, and Banais are now all reduced in
numbers, scattered and mired in poverty.29
On the eve of Partition, the PEA came to play a central role in the attempts of a
number of politically-active lowland Garos, the self-styled A’chik Shongho,30 to
have their ‘homeland’ included in India. They wanted, in the words of former
A’chik Shongho general secretary Arun Gagra, ‘that our PEA should be amalga-
mated with Assam. We didn’t want to remain in Pakistan because we have most
social similarity with the hill people’.31 The A’chik Shongho members raised
money to send a ‘Garo delegation’ to Calcutta to meet members of the Partition
Boundary Commission—but only lowland Garos took part. Monendra, one of its
members, recalls:
We sent our demands to the commissioner of the Division Committee.
Radcliffe32 was in charge of this area. He was in Calcutta, so we went
there to meet the committee . . .. There was a lawyer who dealt with the
objections about the Partition. We met him and he listened very
carefully. He tried his best but did not manage to settle the matter.
Radcliffe said that this was a very small area without a special
boundary, so it was not possible to attach the area to India.33
The story is confirmed by an unpublished report of members of the Boundary
Commission. Two of its Muslim members wrote:
A claim has been made on behalf of a minor non-Muslim organization
that the non-Muslim portion of the Partially Excluded Areas located on
the northern side of Mymensingh district in East Bengal should be
excluded from East Bengal and added to the Garo Hills area of
Assam. The main ground for this claim is that this area is inhabited
29 Elsewhere I show that the introduction of Christianity facilitated the organisation and unification of the lowland
Garos. See Bal, ‘They Ask If We Eat Frogs’: Garo Ethnicity in Bangladesh, Chap. 7.
30 Although the name suggests the inclusion of hill Garos (A’chik), the organisation only had lowland Garo or Mandi
members.
31 Personal interview with Arun Gagra by Suborno Chisim and author.
32 Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British lawyer, was appointed in 1947 as the chairman of the two Boundary Committees that
partitioned the British Imperial territory of India.
33 Personal interview with Monendra by Suborno Chisim and author.
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by tribes who have not much in common with the residents of the
remaining part of East Bengal, but have racial, social, and economic
ties with the tribes inhabiting the Garo Hills.34
But the bid failed. On 15 August 1947, the Garos of Bengal became citizens of the
newly-established Dominion of Pakistan. The Boundary Commission had found no
reason to take the Garo claim into consideration.35 Nevertheless, their territorial link
with the PEA continued to play a vital role in the self-perception of the Garos.
Unwelcome in East Pakistan
According to the 1951 census, only some 40,000 Garos lived within the borders of
East Pakistan. Documentation about the Mymensingh border during the first months
after Partition is scarce, and only a few elderly Garos have any clear recollections of
the period. Yet it seems that, compared to other parts of the Bengal borderland, this
area remained relatively undisturbed for some years to come.
Slowly, however, the Garos were confronted with the fact that they had become a
tiny minority in an overwhelmingly Muslim, Bengali-dominated society. At the
same time, the cosy relationship between the Christian missionaries and the state
was severed. While the missionaries had been in a relatively influential position
earlier, they now were confronted with a suspicious state—despite their efforts to
demonstrate a pro-Pakistan attitude.36 In 1952, three criminal cases were filed
against foreign Catholic missionaries in Haluaghat and Durgapur accusing them
of forcing Muslim converts (Garos) to return to Christianity.37
34 Mr. Justice A.S.M. Akram and Mr. Justice S.A. Rahman, ‘Report of Muslim Members’, 28 July 1947, in ‘Reports
of Members of the Boundary Commission’, India Office Library Archives, London.
35 Justices Akram and Rahman wrote: ‘No part of the Province of Bengal can be tagged on to an area outside the
Province. Secondly, the Partially Excluded Areas are really five thanas in the Mymensingh district which are
Muslim majority thanas. They are contiguous to the main Muslim majority block, and therefore hardly any justifica-
tion exists for excluding any part of them from East Bengal’. Ibid.
36 For instance on 23 March 1950, a Catholic procession was held in Mymensingh town. Two thousand Garos had
come to Mymensingh to join the procession: ‘[t]he Garos—men, women, and children—formed a procession and,
carrying the banners of their sodalities [sic] and the Papal flag and that of Pakistan, marched to the station reciting the
rosary and singing’. Raymond C. Clancy, The Congregation of Holy Cross in East Bengal, 1853–1953. In Three
Parts with a Brief History of the Church in Bengal. Volume II (Holy Cross Foreign Mission Seminary, Washington
DC: unpublished manuscript, 1953), p.341.
37 The Archbishop of Dhaka came in person to see the chief secretary to the Government of East Bengal. He was of
the opinion that the members of his mission had been harassed unnecessarily. The district magistrate commented:
‘These cases are the result of the Christian Missionaries’ trying to get back to their religion the few aboriginals
who have recently embraced Islam, by threat, intimidation and use of force. Surely we cannot tolerate this’. ‘The
Christian Missionaries Must Forget Their Old Mission Raj in the Partially Excluded Area’, letter to M.A. Majid
(29 March 1952), File E-6 1952, Home B Proceedings. Government of East Bengal, List 118 Bundle 70. I thank
Willem van Schendel for drawing my attention to these cases.
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Although the sparse data (occasional interview fragments, missionary documents,
and administrative notes) suggest that the situation in the border area remained com-
paratively calm, life never returned to what it had been before Partition. Fear and
insecurity became a constant factor in the lives of Bengal’s Garos. An elder Garo
informant told us that ‘after the Partition we knew that it would become difficult
for non-Muslim people to live in East Pakistan. The leaders of the Muslim
League spoke openly that everyone in East Pakistan had to become Muslim, or
leave the country’.
1964: The Great Exodus
At the beginning of 1964, northern Mymensingh witnessed a sudden influx of Bengali
refugees from Assam, followed by Bengalis from other parts of Mymensingh (such as
Gafargaon, Kishorganj, Trisal, and Nandail). Although the inflow had begun in 1963,
it increased dramatically in early 1964 when India and East Pakistan witnessed new
outbursts of communal violence.38 In the wake of these riots, East Pakistan took in
more than a million Muslim refugees from the Indian states of West Bengal,
Tripura, and Assam.39
The arrival of Bengali newcomers coincided with thievery and intimidation of the
local non-Muslim population and with illegal settlements on their lands. Rumours
rapidly spread throughout the border area that more Bengalis would come to rape
and kill. Within one month, almost all the Garos from the border area had fled
(with the exception of the people from Durgapur thana). Haluaghat thana, where I
conducted most of my field research, was seriously affected by the disturbances.
Villagers’ stories tell of an influx of Muslim Bengali refugees from India; the
arrival of landless Muslim Bengalis from other places in East Pakistan; illegal
occupations; illegal settlements on the land of local non-Muslim people; robbery;
the spread of rumours; and intimidation (with a strong communal flavour) by the
newly-arrived Bengalis, local Bengalis, and representatives of the state (East
Pakistan Rifles, paramilitary Ansars, and police).
When news reached the villagers that the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) had been shoot-
ing at the Garos fleeing across the border, the villagers gathered on the Catholic
mission compound and decided to leave. Within one day, on 5 February 1964,
almost all the Garos left—leaving behind the Muslim Bengalis. A Garo informant
recounted the events of the day:
38 See for example: A.F.M. Kamaluddin, ‘Refugee Problems in Bangladesh,’ in L.A. Kosinski and K. Maudood
Elahi (eds.), Population Redistribution and Development in South Asia (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1985), p.222; and James J. Novak, Bangladesh. Reflections on the Water (Dhaka: University
Press Ltd., 1994), p.91.
39 See Kamaluddin, ‘Refugee Problems in Bangladesh’, p.222.
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The next day, we found all surrounding houses and villages occupied
by [Bengali] refugees. Not a single house was left unoccupied. The
same day, Bengalis from Trisal, Nandail, Kishorganj and Gafargaon
arrived by buses and trucks. I don’t know how they got the news so
quickly. The whole day they continued to arrive.
In India, the Garo refugees were housed in camps. Conditions were bad. Many
people fell ill and died. Local Garos encouraged the refugees to stay, and both mis-
sionaries and the Indian government took steps to rehabilitate them and provided
financial support. Nevertheless, many did not want to stay in India. After two or
three months, people started, slowly and hesitantly, to return. The newsletter
‘Chronicles of Biroidakuni Mission’ reported: ‘there is a state of restlessness very
noticeable in those who have returned to stay and in those who went back to the
hills. They seem to be going in circles’.40 Our informants provided several
reasons for this behaviour. They wanted to escape the dire conditions in the
camps but many also wanted to return to the place they considered home: ‘It was
our motherland, and we had lands here. That is why we came back’.
Garos refer to the 1963–64 events as a conscious attempt by the Pakistan govern-
ment, in the words of one informant, ‘to drive the tribals out of this area’. ‘After
the eviction of the Hajongs (in 1950) they now wanted to kick out the Garos’.
Another Garo contended that the government had been behind the lootings and sup-
pression of the Garos and other minorities in the border area. Available documents
support the suggestion that state agencies, such as the East Pakistan Rifles, the para-
military Ansar, and the police played an active role in the suppression and intimida-
tion of the Garos and that the leniency of the central government allowed the
situation to escalate. For example, after a visit to the border area, the Archbishop
of Dhaka wrote in his yearly Easter message in March 1964:
I was aware of the danger long ago, and I warned the Government of
what was likely to happen if strict measures were not taken to stop
these injustices. Unfortunately, my warnings were not heeded. I have
spent a great deal of time during these months in the border area,
trying to keep our people from going away. You would not believe
that such things could happen in such a short time.41
40 In November of that year, the ‘Chronicles of Biroidakuni Mission’ estimated that half of the Catholic population
of Biroidakuni (Garos) had returned but after that month the ‘Chronicles’ stop reporting. Our interviews revealed that
Garos continued to come back in the following year too. There are no final figures about returnees available. ‘Chron-
icles of Biroidakuni Mission’ (5 July, 25 Oct., and 10–30 Nov. 1964).
41 ‘Archbishop’s Easter Message’, Protibeshi, Vol.11 (29 Mar. 1964), p.3. See also ‘Chronicles of Biroidakuni
Mission’ (28 Jan. 1964).
450 SOUTH ASIA
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
56
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
Remarkably in light of these atrocities, the Pakistan government finally invited the
Garos to return—literally called on them to do so through loudspeakers installed
on the border. This sudden change in state attitude was probably caused by inter-
national pressure. On other levels, however, a more aggressive state attitude
towards the non-Muslim population of northern Mymensingh developed after
1964. For example the ‘Enemy Property Ordinance’ ruled that the property of
Indian nationals and East Pakistanis residing in India was forfeit to the Pakistan
government. People who had their lands declared ‘Enemy Property’ were forced
to spend a great deal of money on court cases. Meanwhile lands belonging to
non-returnees were occupied by Bengalis, whether illegally or under the ordinance.
It has been argued that the law was strategically (mis)used against all non-Muslim
inhabitants of East Pakistan (and later of Bangladesh).42
After 1965, foreign missionaries were no longer allowed to work in the border area.
In practice, this meant that particularly the Garos of Mymensingh (living in a border-
land) lost their support. Contemporary Garos often point to 1964 as the turning point
between good and bad times, between the days when they were left to themselves
and the days of Bengali Muslim domination. Only then did all the Garos put aside
their differences and come to realise that they were one and the same people. An
informant recalled:
In 1964, the Mandi [i.e., Garo] people got in trouble for the first time.
These problems were the same for all groups and everyone had to flee
to India. During those days, all Mandis became united. They realised
that they were the same people. Since then they have not cared about
who is an Atong or a Megam. Before that, we maintained no relation-
ships with Megam and Atong.43
The Garos of Bangladesh
After East Pakistan’s Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won the elections that should have
made him prime minister of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army went into action. On the
42 The Enemy Property Ordinance was the result of the 17-day war between India and Pakistan in 1964. The prop-
erties were to be returned after the war. Yet the State of War ended officially only with Bangladesh’s independence in
1971. This meant that the property of Garo refugees were also declared ‘Enemy Property’. In 1974, the Bangladesh
government confirmed it as the ‘Vested and Non-Resident Property (Administration) Act (XLVI)’. Officially no new
names were to be added after 1974, but in reality the law continued to be applied until 1991. See R.W. Timm, The
Adivasis of Bangladesh (London: Minority Rights Group, 1991), p.21.
43 The lowland Garos used to be divided into several localised groups such as the Atong, Chibok, Abeng, and Kochu,
who spoke their own dialects or language. Some groups maintained close relations with one another but between
others contacts (including marriage) were rare or even absent. These days, the significance of these groups is
very small.
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night of 26 March 1971, a nine-month war began in which between 300,000 and 1
million East Pakistanis died. In December, when the Pakistan Army surrendered, a
free Bangladesh emerged. People like the Garos, who also joined the freedom
struggle, shared the hopes and dreams of that moment. However soon after the
birth of Bangladesh they discovered that they were not regarded as ideal citizens.
Therefore with memories of 1964 fresh in their minds, the Garos decided to leave
before the border area turned into a war zone. Even so, the Garos were forced to
run the gauntlet of hostile Bengali Muslims and, as soon as they left, their houses
were occupied by Bengalis. Looting started with the Pakistan Army’s arrival.
Within months, Muslim Bengalis were joining the Garos in the refugee camps
across the border.
Many young Garos from Mymensingh joined the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force).
A recent inventory of freedom fighters from Haluaghat thana lists 330 names, of
which more than one third (118) were local Garos.44 Other ‘tribals’ from northern
Mymensingh, such as Koches, Banais, and Hajongs, also joined the ‘freedom
fighters’. One former (Garo) freedom fighter remembers a meeting with the
Bangladesh government-in-exile at which they had been asked to join the war:
The Garo leaders asked them what advantages they would be getting
after the war. The reply was that all demands would be fulfilled.
After several meetings [however] the Garos had still not managed to
agree on the demands. They were politically divided.
The actual recruitment of volunteers took place in the refugee camps. Arthur, one of
our Garo informants, explained how he had felt the excitement vibrating in the air
and how this encouraged him to join the Mukti Bahini: ‘We joined the freedom fight-
ers for no other reasons than other people; it was quite emotional’. At the same time
he was also dreaming of a better future:
We wanted an independent country. We had been exploited by the
Pakistanis. We wanted to live in this country with the dignity of citizens
of a free country. In those days they [Pakistanis] did not recruit the adi-
vasis [tribals] in their army or in the police force; they totally ignored
the adivasis. Another thing was that we wanted to prove our feelings for
the country, that we also loved this country. We wanted to show that we
were also citizens of this country.
44 See Mymensingh Jila Trust, 71-er Proshikkon Shibirer Pramanyo Dolil (Authentic Documents of the Training
Camps of ‘71) (Mymensingh: Mymensingh Jila Trust, n.d.).
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In December 1971 with the aid of the Indian Army, Bangladesh became an indepen-
dent country. Many Garos now felt it was safe to return. But what, exactly, were they
returning to?
During their stay in the camps in India, many Garos pondered this question. Yet few
could agree on a plan of action. The Garos left for Bangladesh without having even
an agreed list of demands, let alone an arrangement with the new government of
Bangladesh for their rehabilitation. And when they finally reached their former
houses they found the destruction of property far worse than in 1964.45 Moreover
it soon became clear that Sheikh Mujib favoured the creation of a state based on
Bengali ethnicity, and had no intention of turning Bangladesh into a multi-ethnic
country:
Some Garos went to see Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. They told him: ‘We
are tribals so we need special care from the government’. They pre-
sented him millam-spie [Garo shield and sword] as a souvenir.
Sheikh Mujib said to them: ‘All people here are Bengali’. The Garos
told him that they needed special protection, but he refused. He told
us that we are Bengalis, and said ‘You do not need any special
privileges’.
In 1973, Sheikh Mujib stated that the ethnic minorities would be promoted to the
status of Bengali, and in 1974 parliament passed a bill that declared Bangladesh a
‘uni-cultural and uni-linguistic nation-state’.46
Urged by the new state leaders to think of themselves as Bengalis, the Garos instead
developed a counter discourse in which they presented themselves as the Garos (or
Mandis) of Bangladesh. In this way they retained their identity as a distinct ethnic
community, different from Bengali Muslims (or Muslim Bengalis), but one rooted
in the new country of Bangladesh. In other words, the very dominant state ideology
which excluded the Garos from the ‘nation’ resulted in a firmer demarcation between
Garos and others—not as outsiders but as full-fledged citizens.47
45 Cf. Burling, Strong Women of Modhupur, p.69.
46 Lamia Karim, ‘Pushed to the Margins: Adivasi Peoples in Bangladesh and the Case of Kalpana Chakma,’ in
Contemporary South Asia, Vol.VII, no.3 (1998), p.307 (emphasis added). See also Rita Manchanda, ‘Crisis of
Minority Rights in South Asia’, in South Asian Journal Vol.XIII, Jul.–Sept. 2006 [http://www.southasianmedia.
net/Magazine/Journal/13_crisis-of-minority.htm]
47 See also Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff and Ellen Bal, ‘De-Partitioning Society: Contesting Borders of the Mind in
Bangladesh and India’, in Smita Tewari Jassal and Eyal Ben-Ari (eds), The Partition Motif in Contemporary
Conflicts (New Delhi and Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007), pp.75–97.
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Concluding Remarks
These days, the Garos of Bangladesh form a close-knit community with a strong
Garo identity. In dominant (insiders’ and outsiders’) discourse the articulation of
the ethnic boundary between the Garos and others is taken for granted and
deemed a remnant of the past, although historical data to substantiate or refute
that idea are scarce. During my research among the Garos of Bangladesh I
learned that until a few decades ago, the differences between lowlanders and hill
Garos (generally attributed to the lowlanders’ contacts with Bengalis and the differ-
ent lifestyles required in a lowland environment) were not the only differences
among all those people labelled Garo. According to many of my elderly informants,
the lowland Garos developed a strong ethnic identity only in the course of the twen-
tieth century.
Various factors contributed to the process of Garo ethnogenesis such as Christianity
and conversion, globalisation, contemporary debates on indigenous peoples, and
incorporation into a modern state and market economy. However, I have focused
here primarily on the role of the Bengali state, and its continuous policies to
‘other’ or exclude the Garos from full participation in the country. On the basis of
a discussion of three different episodes in the lives of the Garos, I have specified
the role that state policies have played in the process of identity formation
amongst the lowland Garos.
The colonial (and also the Christian missionary) suggestions that the Garos and
neighbouring vulnerable ‘tribes’ needed special protection resulted in the partial ter-
ritorial separation of the northern part of Mymensingh and incidentally in the cre-
ation of a separate ‘Garo homeland’. It should be noted however that these
colonial notions of pluralism, which were rooted in ‘existing ideas of hierarchy
that find expression in prejudices shaping everyday encounters between peoples
who see each other as fundamentally different because of the persistence of old
stereotypes’,48 did not lead to their total exclusion from the state. It was different
after 1947. Successive power-holders in Pakistan and Bangladesh availed them-
selves alternately of religion (Islam) and ethnicity (Bengali-ness) as the most import-
ant ingredient of their national discourses and images of their ideal-type citizens.49
In Pakistan notions of true citizenship based on a shared Islamic identity resulted in
the (forceful) exclusion of the ‘other’ (non-Muslims) as outsiders. And as for the
48 Charles Keyes, ‘Presidential Address: “The Peoples of Asia”—Science and Politics in the Classification of Ethnic
Groups in Thailand, China and Vietnam’, in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.61, no.4 (Nov. 2002), p.1193.
49 Cf. Willem van Schendel, ‘Who Speaks for the Nation? Nationalist Rethoric and the Challenge of Cultural Plur-
alism in Bangladesh’ in Erik-Jan Zu¨rcher and Willem van Schendel (eds), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the
Muslim World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). Also see Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd.), 1997.
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promise of an ‘inclusive’ Bangladeshi nation-state in 1971—that was short-lived.
Sheikh Mujib—although eager to keep religion out of politics—was determined
that the new state should have an essentially Bengali identity. These two discourses
on national identity (based on an Islamic identity or on Bengali-ness) have continued
to dominate the Bangladeshi national discourse. Until this day no significant con-
ceptions of Bangladesh as a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious nation-
state have developed.
Especially since 1971, the Garos of Bangladesh have developed into a self-conscious
community. They have given priority to educating their children. Many are studying
in colleges and universities. Others have found jobs in national and international
businesses and governmental and non-governmental organisations. Today, more
than ever before, they also demand a voice. Yet until the minorities in Bangladesh
are made to feel that they are also equal citizens of the state, they will never experi-
ence a true sense of security. This being the case, there remains a possibility that the
Garos might seek to protect themselves through a further strengthening of their
ethnic identity—by further sealing the mental boundaries between self and ‘other’.50
50 For similar observations see for example Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff, Tyranny of Partition: Hindus in Bangladesh
and Muslims in India (New Delhi: Gyan Publications, 2006), p.136.
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